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In their apparently never-ending search for new ways to pay for capital
infrastructure without raising general tax rates, local governments have
increasingly turned to developers as the source of funding for numerous
improvements. Known generically as exactions, the costs imposed on new
commercial and residential development range from dedication of land for
public improvements to fees to fund public services such as roads and utilities,
and, less commonly, to requests for developer contributions to day care
facilities and other social programs.' In their recent monograph, Professors
Altshuler and G6mez-Ibd.fiez trace the historical development and current scope
of land use exactions and challenge some of the common wisdom about the
fairness and efficiency of exaction strategies. Their concise volume should
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I. As the authors note, the more traditional exactionsare defended as a means of mitigating the negative
physical effects of development, whereas requiring a developer to contribute, for example, to the provision
of day care or affordable housing extends the scope of exactions to include mitigation of the "social
byproducts of new land uses." ALAN A. ALTSHULER & Jost G6MEZ-IBk&EZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE 4,42
(1993) [hereinafter REGULATION FOR REVENUE]. While some of these social exactions are accomplished through
a straightforward imposition of a fee or dedication requirement, the zoning ordinance can also be used.
Through the technique of inclusionary zoning, a local government requires a developer of land to devote
a certain percentage of the developmentto low and moderate-income housing. Although inclusionary zoning
could be considered a form of exactions, the authors have excluded inclusionary zoning from the scope of
their study. Id. at 5-6.
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stimulate parties on both sides of this political planning issue. For the pro-
exaction forces, Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdflez's analysis of fairness and
efficiency concerns should temper their zeal for pinning all costs on the
developer. At the same time, the anti-exaction forces should consider carefully
the strong dose of real-world pragmatism in the authors' conclusion that
exactions may be preferable to most of their alternatives.
While recognizing that the increasing scope and frequency of exactions
can be seen as an incremental evolution, the authors identify the early 1970s
as a period of fundamental change in local government exactions practice.
Although others have simply noted the increased magnitude and popularity of
exactions,2 Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdflez identify seven distinct historical trends
underlying changes in exactions practice: neighborhood activism, environmental
awareness and regulation, taxpayer revolts, decreasing federal aid, infrastructure
backlog,' increasing government mandates, and the development of fiscal
impact analysis. Local fiscal crises, coupled with generally relaxed and
deferential judicial review at the state level, created a favorable political and
legal environment for the rapid spread of exactions. The precise cost of
exactions is difficult to measure, because they typically involve particularized
negotiation rather than application of a predetermined formula, and because
many exactions consist of in-kind transfers rather than direct revenue
contributions. The authors, nevertheless, present a convincing array of fiscal
studies to document their assertion that, in terms of the sheer dollar magnitude
of exactions, the range of their purposes, and the number of communities
involved, a true "exaction revolution" has occurred.4
Fundamental to this shift in infrastructure financing was a concurrent
attitudinal change about growth itself. Before the 1970s, community growth was
seen as a stimulus to population increases and economic growth through higher
real estate values. Because the community as a whole benefitted from growth,
distributing the cost of infrastructure through general taxation was not
objectionable. Since the 1970s, however, that conventional wisdom has been
rejected. Growth is frequently seen as a drain on the local community, rarely
producing adequate revenue to pay for the burdens it imposes on the public
infrastructure. Thus, the pre- 1970 attitude that the beneficiary of growth should
pay for the growth has remained intact; what is new since 1970 is the
2. See, e.g., Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's
Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515 (1988) [hereinafter Taub, Exactions]; Donald L. Connors and Michael E.
High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69
(1987); Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take 'My Beach Please! ": Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and a Rational-Nexus ConstitutionalAnalysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REv. 823 (1989).
3. For example, the authors note that between 1960 and 1984, public sector spending on infrastructure
declined from 2.3% of the gross national product to 1. 1%. REGULATION FOR REVENUE, supra note I, at 26.
4. Id. at 8, 34-41.
Vol. 11:507, 1994
Land Use Exactions
identification of the developer, rather than the general community, as the
supposed beneficiary.
I. Fairness Concerns
The main rallying point for those who promote and impose local exactions
is the assertion that it is only fair to put the cost of new infrastructure on those
who have created the infrastructure strain. As a statement of public policy, this
assertion reflects at least three underlying assumptions: first, that it is more
equitable to allocate the cost of capital and other improvements to the developer
than to spread the cost equally on the entire community through general
revenue raising devices; second, that because existing development already paid
its own way, new development should follow suit; and third, that the local
government can accurately measure the true cost imposed on capital
infrastructure by growth. Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdflez persuasively challenge
all of these unstated underpinnings of most exaction techniques.
Although exactions are consistent with the premise that it is unfair to
impose the cost of development on the existing community, the authors
highlight other equitable criteria that may be overlooked in the rush to recover
the cost of new infrastructure. In various fairness equations, exactions appear
less fair than several alternatives. If, for instance, equitable concerns dictate that
those assessed for the cost of infrastructure should pay no more than their pro
rata contribution to the demand for that infrastructure, or that the cost of public
infrastructure ought to be allocated on the basis of ability to pay, or that a
community should not discriminate against newcomers,5 then exactions begin
to look less fair than, for example, well-structured user fees. Thus, although
exactions may seem fair because they place the cost of new infrastructure
demands on the supposed culprit, they also discriminate against younger
property owners6 and have the regressive redistributional effect of favoring
more affluent over poorer households.7
5. One study of exactions in Loveland, Colorado, supports the authors' claim that not only do exactions
discriminate against newcomers, they also provide a windfall to existing homeowners. When the price of
newly developed property rises because it must absorb the cost of the exactions, the price of existing
property will also rise because both types of property operate in the same market. Id. at 49, 105. This type
of discrimination is unlikely to find redress in the courts. In fact, in some states, discrimination against
newcomers even extends to the property tax. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326 (1992), the Supreme
Court gave its blessing to California's property tax assessment formula, which calculatesthe assessed value
of real property in the state accordingto its 1975 assessed value or its date of acquisition, whichever is later.
6. A preference for existing over new homeowners translates into a preference for older over younger
owners, because existing homeowners are more likely to be older than new home buyers. REGULATION FOR
REVENUE, supra note I, at 105.
7. The authors point out that because exactions are typically calculated on a per unit cost, the burden
on lower income units will be proportionally higherthan the burden on more expensiveunits. In the absence
of waivers for low income purchasers, then, exactions may be regressive in their effects. Id. at 97, 106-10.
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Moreover, even if the proponents of exactions remain steadfast in their
conviction that the most compelling criterion of fairness is that existing property
owners should not shoulder burdens created by new property owners, the
authors raise serious concerns about whether exactions accurately measure and
allocate the costs of that new infrastructure. Stated simply, Altshuler and
G6mez-Ibdfiez forcefully repudiate the proposition that growth alone causes
increased demand for infrastructure. In their discussion of increased demand
for highways, for example, they highlight numerous sources in addition to new
growth: the rise in the number of households with two working adults;
individual decisions to rely on private rather than public transit; aggressive
automobile sales campaigns; and decisions by businesses not involved in land
development in siting their offices, factories, and commercial enterprises!8
Although their conclusion that "[d]evelopment generally is a less important
cause of increasing infrastructure demand than other forces, such as rising
standards for infrastructure services and rising income ' appears somewhat.
overstated on the basis of the evidence adduced, the authors demonstrate
nonetheless that because local governments usually overlook these concurrent
sources of infrastructure demand, they will routinely overassess new growth
for its share of the cost of new infrastructure."0 In addition, they suggest that
in the decades before 1970 the general willingness to spread the costs of
infrastructure among the broader community may have been based on an
erroneous assumption that growth in that era did in fact pay its own way. If
they are correct in their suggestion that local governments in the 1950s and
1960s understated the costs of growth, exactions become doubly perverse: not
only did pre-1970 development manage to escape the direct assessment of its
true cost on infrastructure by spreading those costs -among the general
community, it now effectively imposed those costs on the next generation of
development.
II. Efficiency Concerns
Professors Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdfiez briefly dissect the assertion that
exactions encourage economically efficient land use development and
infrastructure allocation. Their analysis of the literature concludes that although
exactions rarely generate efficiency gains, they may be less inefficient than
alternative ways of funding infrastructure improvements. In short, the authors
see two major incentives for inefficient calculation of exaction charges. First,
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 62.
10. The authors do note, however, that even with a strong consensus that development should pay for
its contribution to infrastructure strain, current allocation methods typically underestimate the cost of new




local governments do not consider the extraterritorial impacts of development,
and may thus underestimate its true cost. Second, most local governments use
exaction formulas that understate the costs of infrastructure, in part to avoid
legal challenge and in part to remain competitive in the marketplace. t Most
formulas, for example, deduct funds available from other government grants
and other sources of general revenue contributions, such as gasoline taxes and
local property taxes. Well-structured user fees, the authors suggest, could
promote more efficient land development and allocation of funds to
infrastructure.
At first glance, Altshuler and G6mez-Ibfez's conclusion that local
governments actually undercharge developers for infrastructure improvements
may appear inconsistent with their assertions throughout the book that exactions
unfairly charge development for infrastructure demand it alone did not create.
These two arguments taken in tandem suggest, however, that exactions in their
totality may actually strike a roughly accurate balance between, on the one
hand, the desire to make growth pay its own way and, on the other, the
recognition that not all new infrastructure demand is caused by growth. For
example, the authors observe that, when setting development impact fees, local
governments typically deduct from the estimated cost of the impacts the amount
of funds available from other general revenue sources.'2 This practice may
simply reflect a local government's awareness that, on fairness grounds, some
of the cost of infrastructure improvement should be shouldered by the general
community.
III. Legal Constraints
The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission 3 has been widely interpreted as imposing a federal constitutional
minimum standard that requires an essential nexus between the conditions or
requirements imposed on developments and the needs generated by that
development. 4 Commentators have suggested that Nollan requires state courts
II. Professor Vicki Been has suggested that competition in the marketplace of municipalities will
prevent a municipality from imposing unfair exactions on developers and will itself deter inefficient land
development patterns. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLuIM. L. REv. 473 (1991). That thesis has been challenged
in a recent article. Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions,45 VAND. L. REv. 831 (1992).
12. REGULATION FOR REVENUE, supra note 1, at 115.
13. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Been, supra note II, at 476; Michael M. Berger, First English Redux: A Kafkaesque
Encounter in Court, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Aug. 1989, at 3,4; William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko,
The "Takings" Nexus - The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from
California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 380, 390-91 (1988); Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn, Finetuning
the TakingEquation:Applyingitto DevelopmentExactions, Part 2, LAND USE L. & ZONINGDIG., Mar. 1988,
at 3, 4; Frank Michelman, Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1988); Terry D. Morgan, Municipal
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to invalidate exactions that have no "substantial causal relationship" 5 to the
needs generated by the development. In fact, however, the Nollan Court did
not reach that issue. In Nollan, the Supreme Court was concerned, not with the
relationship between the exaction and the demand placed on local infrastructure
by the proposed development, but rather with the relationship between the
exaction and the police power objective furthered by the exaction policy. 6
All exactions involve a relationship among three interdependent elements:
the policy goal furthered, the condition or fee imposed, and the strain on the
infrastructure caused by the development. The validity of the exaction depends
on the relationship between the exaction and the goal, and that between the
proposed development and infrastructure needs. The Nollan Court, which was
concerned only with the former relationship, invalidated the California Coastal
Commission's requirement that the Nollans grant the public a lateral easement
along their beachfront, not because it believed that the Commission had
erroneously concluded that the proposed development would significantly
decrease visual access to the beach, but rather because the Court concluded that
the exaction did not rationally further the Coastal Commission's police power
objective of preserving visual access. 7Numerous state court opinions, however,
have. specifically considered the latter relationship, and have adopted a wide
range of tests for determining how close the fit must be between the exaction
imposed and the demand for infrasturcture created by development. 8
Responsesto the Supreme Court 'sNewRegulatory TakingOptions, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Nov. 1987,
at 3,4; Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1731 (1988); Norman
Williams, Jr., A Narrow Escape? Part 2, 16 ZONING AND PLANNING REPORT 121 (1993).
15. Taub, Exactions, supra note 2, at 579. See also Linda J. Bozung, Exactions, Dedicationsand impact
Fees, in HANDLING LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF REAL ESTATE 1991, at 245-48 (PLI Rea] Estate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 367, 1991).
16. In Nollan, the Court invalidated the Coastal Commission's attempt to require beachfront property
owners to dedicate an easement across their property in exchange for permission to replace a small, existing
cabin with a larger modem home. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, assumed that the Commission's
objective of increasing visual access to the beach constituted a valid governmental purpose. On that basis,
then, the Commission could have prohibited the denser developmentproposed by the landowners. Similarly,
Scalia suggested, the Commission could have imposed conditions on the development that would have
furthered the objective of preserving visual access, such as requiring the Nollans to construct a "viewing
spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. The lateral access easement required by the Commission, however, did nothing
to promote the Commission's stated goal of preserving visual access of the beach: "It is quite impossible
to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house." Id. at 838.
Lacking the "essential nexus" to a legitimate government purpose, the easement was invalidated by the Court
-as an illegitimate taking of property.
17. The Court observed: "The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition
substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition." 483 U.S. at 837.
18. These state court tests range from a more deferential test requiring the local governmentto establish
only that there is a reasonable relationship between the project and the burdens created, to a more stringent
test that limits the local government's ability to impose the cost of infrastructure on a new development
unless the need for the infrastructure is "uniquely attributable" to the development project. In fact, the
Nollan Court cited to this large group of state court cases with apparent approval. 483 U.S. at 839-40.
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The Supreme Court is currently considering its first exactions case since
its 1987 decision in Nollan. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,'9 the Court will review
the Oregon Supreme Court's decision upholding the imposition of two exactions
on a landowner who sought to replace an existing commercial building with
a larger structure. Dolan clearly addresses Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdflez's
concerns about the extent to which the local government should be required to
establish that the need for the infrastructure is in fact attributable to the
development subject to the exaction. In this case, the city conditioned its
permission for development on the landowners' conveyance of a 15-foot
easement for storm water management and an 8-foot easement for a bicycle
pathway. The Oregon court found that the conditions were legitimate, because
it concluded that the expanded use of the property would generate additional
vehicular traffic and would increase storm water runoff by covering a larger
portion of the land than does the existing development.
Justice Peterson's dissent in Dolan finds in the city's exactions the same
weaknesses documented by Professors Altshuler and G6mez-lbdfiez. First, it
criticizes the majority for upholding the bicycle pathway easement on the basis
of the city's generalized conclusion that the completed pathway system "could
offset some of the traffic demand" generated by the new development."0 With
regard to the flood control easement, the dissent found even less justification
in the city's imposition of an easement because the property drains into a creek
with serious existing drainage problems. The dissent argued that the city should
only be able to impose on the property owners exactions that directly ameliorate
negative conditions caused by their development proposal. Yet the city made
no precise determinations of the increase in runoff to be expected from the new
commercial building. The analysis of Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdftez reinforces
the Dolan dissent's complaint that the city has not allocated the cost of
development fairly; thus, this case presents a clear opportunity for the Supreme
Court to consider many of their observations.
IV. Policy Concerns
Economic analysis suggests that the current exactions environment unfairly
singles out new development to bear the cost of infrastructure demands it alone
did not create, but the Supreme Court may nonetheless decline to impose
demands for financial precision on local governments. After all, the Court has
frequently noted how government must be allowed to operate within a fairly
generous margin of error.2 Moreover, the Court has squarely rejected similar
19. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544, No. 93-518 (1993).
20. 854 P.2d at 447.
21. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, (1926), the case in which the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning for the first time, the Court stressed: "[tihe inclusion of a
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economic fairness arguments with regard to the cost allocation involved in
historic preservation, noting simply that although government condemnation
of historic property may more equitably distribute the cost, "widespread public
ownership of historic properties ... is neither feasible nor wise."2 And in fact,
Professors Altshuler and G6mez-Ib~flez may not be too unhappy with a less
than precise judicial approach to exactions, because they themselves recognize
that in the real world, exactions are better than many of the potential
alternatives.
Although exactions may be unfair and inefficient, the authors suggest that
it is unrealistic to expect that the current fiscal and political climate will see
them replaced by a superior cost allocation method, such as general taxation
or sophisticated user fees. According to this line of reasoning, if the Supreme
Court does adopt a stricter level of review of exactions, thereby making local
governments less likely to adopt them, that holding by the Court might have
the unfortunate effect of leading governments to adopt even more regressive
and inefficient solutions. For example, the authors squarely reject growth
controls as inflationary and unfairly providing a windfall to existing property
owners whose land would thus compete in an artificially restricted market.
Similarly, and perhaps in response to concerns about the scope of Nollan's
nexus constraints, some commentators have advocated the adoption of a local
excise tax on development that would replace exactions without spreading the
cost of development to the general community. 3 This alternative seems to
single out development much as exactions do, without the concomitant nexus
requirement that at least imposes some restraint on those responsible for
imposing local exactions.
In the final analysis, Altshuler and G6mez-Ibdfiez's volume does an
outstanding job of revealing the flaws in the thinking of the proponents of
exactions, while at the same time recognizing the political and sociological
forces exaction opponents should acknowledge. The "make growth pay its own
way" attitude is not likely to go away soon, nor, as the authors suggest, are the
courts likely to impose a more stringent standard of review on local exactions
formulas and negotiated efforts. As a result, although Altshuler and G6mez-
IbdfIez's conclusion that exactions are better than the even-more-undesirable
alternatives may displease the anti-exaction forces, their insightful
reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of
invalidity." Id. at 388-89. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ("If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice
it results in some inequality."'); Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) ("The
problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations-illogical,it may be, and unscientific.").
22. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109 n.6 (1974).




documentation of the trends that created this climate suggests that they are
correct in their pragmatic assessment of real-world options. The book is cogent
and persuasive without being doctrinaire. Its insights are provocative to both
sides of the exactions debate, and it provides a wealth of historical evidence
and political analysis in an extremely readable and tightly organized volume.

